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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Progress Report from [REDACTED]  
12 December, 1952.

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25X1A 1. Arrived [REDACTED] on the night of 3 December, 1952. Stayed overnight and went to the [REDACTED] on the 4th. Saw [REDACTED] 25X1A9a  
25X1A9a [REDACTED] and inquired about the status of the items that they had thought, when I left Washington, would come up for discussion about the 13th of December. These items are now tentatively scheduled for the first of January, accordingly, I arranged to call [REDACTED] and give him a number at which he could reach me in 25X1A9a  
25X1A6a [REDACTED] He, then, will call me when the dates for discussion are firmed up. He indicated that I would be needed in [REDACTED] for no more than a week, but it appears to me that the actual time will be more like two days. 25X1A

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25X1A9a 2. Arrived [REDACTED] late in the afternoon of the 5th. Got in touch with Mike at once, and with [REDACTED] decided to see me first on Monday morning, so Mike and I talked over the job for the rest of the day.

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25X1A6a 3. Saw [REDACTED] first thing on Monday, December 8. Trouble started right then and there. They were completely embittered to find that they couldn't actually put me on a train at the end of the week with an open mandate to go to all of the previously exploited [REDACTED] sources and, on my own, collect all of the economic intelligence that I could.

It turned out that there is at present (and likely to be for some time) only one man at this facility who can run interrogations. He, of course, has his hands full keeping up with the current sources.

25X1A6a 4. I moved out to [REDACTED] headquarters on Monday and had further talks with [REDACTED] 25X1A9a

25X1A9a [REDACTED] He indicated the same sense of disappointment as had [REDACTED] At any rate, I got started that day on a review of the sources which have been exploited, and I expect to be engaged in that process for a while, it being one of the good starting points.

In setting up a work program, I think that the following three lines of endeavor will be the ones that will occupy me for a while: 25X1A6a

a. Look over the dossiers and reports already prepared by [REDACTED] This will result in:

- 25X1A6a (1) A delineation of the areas within ORR's interest that the ordinary [REDACTED] interrogations do not cover.  
(2) A list of questions on selected facilities in the USSR which have been put to sources in the past, but which have not been satisfactorily answered.

As a result of these, it will be possible for me to give guidance in future interrogations.

b. Search the list of prospects for the names of those people who would be most productive from ORR's point of view.

As a result of this, give guidance to the operations people.

c. Prepare briefs, as necessary, and as it becomes possible to do so, which furnish the general background necessary for the interrogators. It will also be a part of this process to give guidance to ORR on the preparation of more satisfactory and workable requirements.

25X1A6a 5. I am amazed, in reading the case books, at the apparently minimal routing of reports prepared by this group to ORR for evaluations. I rather suspect that there is some apathy in ORR toward the [REDACTED] because (1) many of the analysts do not realize that there even exists such a group [REDACTED] and (2) the [REDACTED] reports have not been routed about in ORR. For example, in the ten reports based 25X1A6a  
25X1X6 on the observations of [REDACTED] (aircraft specialist from Podbereshe) there was not a single evaluation from I/AR, in spite of the fact that economic intelligence was contained in almost every one of them. In addition, there was much room for the submission of requirements on that source -- his possibilities had been explored along only the most obvious lines. 25X1A

25X1A6a 6. On some of the [REDACTED] reports which have been evaluated by ORR, comment has been rather critical. In the worst case I noted, a proper job of interrogation had been done, and the information was worthwhile, yet the report got an E-4 rating, plus a lengthy screed on what a bum job had been done. I was really sickened. Far more common, however, is a situation wherein a branch indicates that the material

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## SECURITY INFORMATION

is already sufficiently known. I have two cases where such a comment is made, yet the briefing given me by those branches indicates that they are desperate for information on the given subject.

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I hope that evaluations of [REDACTED] will be carefully prepared -- it will make the job a lot easier.

25X1A6a In preparing evaluations on [REDACTED] material, three things should be kept in mind:

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- a. Specific Requests for Information which were submitted by one branch may not have been received in time for inclusion in a given report. Therefore, don't give a poor evaluation to a report that may serve someone else's needs perfectly. It appears, from here, that ORR is sometimes asked to make evaluations on material that is of primary interest to OSI. The home OSO office knows that, but [REDACTED] doesn't. Therefore, the home office, seeing an unfavorable report from ORR could discount it -- [REDACTED] would feel, in such a situation, that the report was sent to ORR because of some fundamental interest, and that they had completely fallen down in not seeing the interest beforehand. [REDACTED] 25X1A6a
- b. If any branch does not feel competent to handle an evaluation, it should so indicate and, if possible, pass it to the branch that it thinks is best suited for this.
- c. A branch cannot, at the present time, submit a requirement of the nature "get all you can about the tie-in between [REDACTED] plant and the [REDACTED] plant" and expect to get any economic intelligence from such a request. I will try to give enough guidance to the interrogators to indicate what such requirements mean, but it will take much missionary work; they simply don't understand why such information is considered valuable, nor do they understand exactly what it is that is wanted in the first place. Requirements must be explicit -- the interrogator can ask the question, but he can't think it up. I will try to deal with the problem of one question being based on another in the individual cases, as they come up.

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7. On Wednesday, 10 December, I started on the process of explaining the objectives and set-up of ORR with [REDACTED]. I was able to point out to them the type of information which we would (or thought we would) be able to get from these sources. These men had two main points to make in describing the difficulties that were to be faced:

- a. Their sources were development engineers, not production people.
- b. They were kept entirely ignorant of the production process.

Fortunately, I had just finished looking over the reports on [REDACTED]. He, or someone just like him, could have for instance given a complete bill of materials for the latest type of Soviet jet bomber, told where it was going to be put into production (rumor had it that the former director at Podbereshe was detached to set up such production facilities -- [REDACTED] unfortunately, didn't know where, but might have) and he could have contributed a great deal of other such information. (Incidentally, if I/AR wants me to approach [REDACTED] on such a bill-of-materials, I will do so).

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8. Had a discussion on the same day with [REDACTED] who heads up the operations group here. I found this to be a very well-controlled set-up. Their files on possible sources is in extremely good shape and under close and strict surveillance. If ORR believes that one source or another would be worth while, the status of that person, who may or may not be under consideration as a possibility for exploitation, can be determined in a matter of minutes. I suggest two things in this connection, therefore:

- a. If someone in ORR wants to know whether it's worthwhile to submit requirements on a person named in an [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] PLEASE go through the following procedure and then submit his name over the Telecon: 25X1A

- (1) Take the complete name from the report.
- (2) Call [REDACTED] office, and determine what "EG" number is equivalent to that [REDACTED] number (the EG number is assigned here, and are not completely cross-referenced against [REDACTED]) 25X1A

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- (3) Refer to the report, by EG number, in requesting information.
- b. If someone in ORR wants a particular source then interrogated (as opposed to simply wanting to know what his status is) the procedure to follow is

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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that outlined in [redacted] memo to [redacted] dated 20 August, 1952  
25X1A6a (from [redacted] and titled "Potential Sources for Information on Heavy Man-  
ufacturing". Don't fail to give the support information necessary, as outlined  
in Bill's memo.

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25X1A9a [redacted] brought up a couple of interesting notes: [redacted] is now  
25X1A6a thought to be under interrogation [redacted] (I am checking on this, and will  
submit, if necessary, additional requirements on my own). [redacted] buddy 25X1A9a  
25X1X6 [redacted] is an [redacted] but, as indicated in the screed that accompanies  
reports from him, is strictly a one-way source. [redacted] had an interest in one 25X1A9a  
25X1X6 [redacted] He can't be reached either, and there is no expectation that he will  
be.

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9. On Thursday, 11 December, I went in and talked to [redacted] He had some  
interesting suggestions and remarks. First of all, he is of the opinion that  
other facilities would be more productive of information of a nature useful to 25X1A6a  
25X1A6a ORR than would [redacted] (he was thinking of [redacted] He did say that there was much to be  
gotten here.

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I am continuing discussions with [redacted] but here as to what position  
I shall assume in the stream of people interrogating a source. It now appears  
that I will not be able to get in on the initial meetings at which is determined  
which agency has the primary interest in the source. This will not be too bad;  
if it doesn't work out that I get the briefing soon enough on what the source knows,  
I'll simply indicate that this is the case. At any rate, it appears that I will  
be able to ~~click~~ get requirements down on every source in the initial go-around.

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10. I expect to run my first interrogation sometime next week. This will be  
of a man by the name of [redacted] He is knowledgeable on Zavod 2,  
Kuibyshev, and the IFA Blechverformung plant in Leipzig, East Germany. I intend  
exploiting him along the lines laid down in my briefings by I/AR, PE,CG, and to  
make inquiries which will be of interest to S/L and OG, possibly others. The  
man does not appear to be a first-rate source, and I suggest that no requirements  
be furnished on Zavod 2, although anything on the IFA plant that is wanted would  
be good for me to have. If Specific Requests for Information have already been  
prepared, I will have them (presumably) by the time I get to him.

25X1A6a The language problem came up in a major way in connection with this man. He had  
been held here until I got in, having been previously subjected to interrogation  
by the Air Force. [redacted] was dying to have me come in and complete my exploitation  
of him so that they could pass him on -- now, of course, they will have to wait  
until the one and only interrogator can get a day's free time.

I feel that I can handle part of the exploitation process with my knowledge of  
German, but the entire process is beyond me.

After this sample, I shall probably be better able to say what the future  
probabilities and possibilities of my operation here will be.

11. My general conclusions thus far are few. I believe that there is much  
fertile ground to be covered in this operation, but one of the major jobs is  
bound to be driving a wedge into the vested interests of the Air Force and OSI.  
I think, at present, that this can be done; it requires careful liason with the  
people here who are somewhat piqued because I don't have complete facility in the  
language. I am sure that this is going to pass. On the other hand, I don't  
know what to say about the language problem as a whole. I am inclined to the  
belief that this is their problem, in view of the fact that all they need here  
(and they readily admit it) are interpreters -- not too many of them, either.

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Much guidance can be accomplished, and I am sure that constructive result  
will come of that. I think that the start, all in all, has been fair.